Translation: Mentalizing as treatment target in Borderline Personality Disorder by Fonagy, P et al.
Translation: Mentalization as Treatment Target in BPD 1 
This is the accepted version of a paper for publication in Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and 
Treatment (http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/per/index.aspx). This article may not exactly replicate the final 
version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. © American Psychological Association. 
December 30, 2014. 
Translation: Mentalizing as treatment target in Borderline Personality Disorder 
 
Peter Fonagy 
Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College 
London, UK 
 
Patrick Luyten 
Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, University of Leuven, Belgium 
Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College 
London, UK 
 
Anthony Bateman 
Halliwick Personality Disorder Service, St Ann’s Hospital, London 
 
Correspondence concerning this chapter should be addressed to Peter Fonagy, 
Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology, University College 
London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK. E-mail: p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk 
  
Translation: Mentalization as Treatment Target in BPD 2 
This is the accepted version of a paper for publication in Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and 
Treatment (http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/per/index.aspx). This article may not exactly replicate the final 
version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. © American Psychological Association. 
December 30, 2014. 
Translation: Mentalizing as Treatment Target in Borderline Personality Disorder 
 
This paper focuses on the clinical application of mentalizing ideas to the treatment of 
BPD. Over the past decades a number of evidence based treatment approaches for this severe 
condition have been developed, MBT being one of these (Stoffers et al., 2012). Here we 
examine the role of mentalizing in relation to BPD with a view to achieving improved levels 
of mentalizing in BPD patients as a therapeutic target. We seek to explain why mentalizing 
works as a treatment target for BPD, and argue that a mentalizing approach to BPD is at the 
core of any successful intervention. Recent developments in our understanding of mentalizing 
continue to influence approaches to treatment and this paper presents an update of the general 
theoretical and clinical approach, and specific treatment interventions and principles.  
Mentalizing is the ability to understand others in terms of their thoughts, feelings, 
wishes, and desires; it is a very human capability that underpins everyday interactions. 
Without mentalizing there can be no robust sense of self, no constructive social interaction, 
no mutuality in relationships and no sense of personal security (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & 
Target, 2002). Mentalizing is therefore a fundamental psychological process and so interfaces 
with all major mental disorders and has generic applicability in psychiatric care (Allen, 
Bleiberg, & Haslam-Hopwood, 2003; Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008).  
Although mentalizing techniques are now applied to a wide range of psychological 
disorders (Bateman & Fonagy, 2012), it is for borderline personality disorder (BPD) that 
mentalization based treatment (MBT) was first developed and for which it has the most 
substantial evidence base (Bateman & Fonagy, 2003; Bateman & Fonagy, 2004;  Bateman & 
Tyrer, 2004). The first section of this paper is an introduction to mentalizing in the context of 
BPD: it gives an overview of the development of the components that comprise full 
mentalization and how these are typically manifest in BPD patients, with a view to 
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appreciating how this contributes to our understanding of treatment targets for BPD. The 
second section explores the theory of social learning and epistemic trust in order to explore 
systems for therapeutic change in BPD and how this links to the importance of mentalizing as 
a theoretically cross-cutting factor across any successful therapeutic intervention. The third 
section focuses on translation of theory into practice in the consulting room: it goes into 
further detail about how therapy can and should address the typical mentalizing features and 
profiles of BPD patients overviewed in the first section, and factors contributing to the failure 
to develop full mentalizing as explored in the second section. The implications of the content 
covered in the previous sections are discussed in terms of the principles, structure, protocols 
and technique of MBT, and illustrated with clinical examples. 
Attachment, mentalizing, and BPD 
There has been much fruitful discussion of the role of mentalizing in the origins of 
BPD and the ways in which infants and children learn about managing relationships and 
emotional states (e.g. Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). Mentalizing skills are acquired in the 
context of early attachment relationships, which have typically been found to be preoccupied 
and disorganized in BPD patients (Choi-Kain, Fitzmaurice, Zanarini, Laverdiere, & 
Gunderson, 2009; Levy, Beeney, & Temes, 2011). Yet, attachment problems alone cannot 
explain the typical clinical picture of BPD. Problems in affect regulation, attentional control, 
and self-control stemming from dysfunctional attachment relationships (Aaronson, Bender, 
Skodol, & Gunderson, 2006; Agrawal, Gunderson, Holmes, & Lyons-Ruth, 2004; Barone, 
Fossati, & Guiducci, 2011; Lyons-Ruth, Yellin, Melnick, & Atwood, 2005; Scott et al., 2013; 
Sroufe, Egeland, Carlson, & Collins, 2005) are thought to be mediated through a failure to 
develop a robust mentalizing capacity (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008). In line with these 
assumptions, we see the defining characteristics of BPD – emotional dysregulation, 
impulsivity, interpersonal dysfunction – as rooted in an instability of the reflective, regulatory 
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capacities that mentalizing affords. From a wider mentalizing perspective, mental disorders in 
general can be seen as the mind misinterpreting its own experience of itself and of others 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2010).  
The potential for mentalizing seems to be an innate human characteristic (Kovacs, 
Teglas, & Endress, 2010) but the full acquisition of this ability is a developmental 
achievement, one that is likely to be highly responsive to environmental influences (Fonagy, 
Target, Gergely, Allen, & Bateman, 2003). Mentalizing capacities seem dependent on the 
quality of the early social learning environment and early attachment experiences; 
specifically, the attachment figures’ ability to respond with contingent and marked affective 
displays in response to the infant’s subjective experience. Mentalizing is thus seen as a 
fundamentally bi-directional or transactional social process (Fonagy & Target, 1997): it is 
influenced by the capacity of our attachment figures to mentalize, but their capacity to 
mentalize is also influenced by the child’s characteristics (e.g., temperament), reflecting so-
called evocative person-environment interactions (Fonagy, 2003; P. Fonagy, Luyten, & 
Strathearn, 2011).  
The bi-directional nature of mentalizing is clearly fundamental to understanding its 
developmental origins, and has considerable bearing on how we conceptualize mental 
disorders in relation to their characteristic interpersonal difficulties. It is also central to how 
we formulate the treatment and treatment targets for psychotherapy in BPD. For individuals 
who have not benefitted from a stable and secure early environment in which they 
experienced consistent validation of their thoughts and feelings (Linehan, 1993), an effective 
therapeutic environment will be a theater for an introduction to mentalizing skills. The 
objective of reaching a state of improved mentalizing in the patient is reached through an 
interactional process whereby the therapist models their own mentalizing capacities and 
demonstrates their ability to mentalize the patient. In other words, mentalizing as an end 
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target is achieved through the experience of being effectively mentalized; it is an implicitly 
processed experience as well as a target of treatment.  
The Multiple Mentalizing Competencies 
We have conceptualized mentalizing as comprised of four attributes or polarities, each 
with two opposing values, or poles (Luyten & Fonagy, this issue). We assume that the 
limitations in mentalizing shown by BPD patients are explained by lack of balance across 
these polarities (see Figure 1). The aim of MBT is to address this imbalance in a manner that 
is closely attentive to moment-to-moment changes in current functioning. Consideration of 
the polarities of mentalizing is helpful in locating the loci where therapists should work (and 
probably normally find themselves working whether they are doing MBT or not) to restore an 
equilibrium into mentalizing capacity. Here, we consider how a BPD patient typically 
presents in relation to each polarity, and the resulting implications for therapy. 
The automatic-controlled polarity: Controlled mentalizing is conscious, verbal, and 
reflective; automatic mentalizing is nonconscious, nonverbal, and unreflective. Individuals 
with BPD often tend toward this latter form of mentalizing. BPD patients are particularly 
likely to fall back on automatic mentalizing at moments of intense emotional arousal (e.g., in 
attachment contexts, challenging interpersonal situations, feelings of shame, guilt, anger, or 
inadequacy), often with severe impairments in social cognition as a consequence (e.g., being 
overly distrustful or trustful, being idealizing or overly denigrating).  
The dramatically reduced capacity of BPD patients for reflective functioning (Fonagy 
et al. (1996)) that is necessary for controlled mentalizing has been shown to be reversible by 
psychotherapy (Levy et al., 2006). The task of the therapist, then, is to help slow down the 
patient’s thinking and move them to a more reflective, explicit form of mentalizing which 
requires more conscious, verbal attention; all without generating a process of pseudo 
reflection or hypermentalizing (Sharp et al., 2013; Sharp et al., 2011).  
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The external–internal polarity: BPD patients tend to interpret the mental states of 
others on the basis of exterior cues (physical and visible features such as gestures or actions, 
or even their own actions) at the expense of internal ones. Indeed, the heightened sensitivity 
to emotional experiences in BPD seems to be intrinsically related to an increased sensitivity 
to external features of self and others as a source of knowledge about mental states (Fonagy 
& Luyten, in press).   
The hypersensitivity of BPD patients to others’ emotions (Gunderson & Lyons-Ruth, 
2008), including those of the therapist, means that they often fail to develop plausible 
scenarios concerning others’ states of mind based on these feelings, and are unable or 
unwilling to consider alternative explanations. Interventions that target mentalizing often 
need to start by examining interpretations based on external features and then generate 
possible plausible scenarios about internal states of mind, particularly the subtleties and 
complexities of people’s internal worlds. The task of the therapist is to attempt to move the 
patient’s focus to mental interiors: the thoughts, feelings, history and experiences that might 
offer further insight into someone’s behavior. This shift involves not only slowing patients 
down and encouraging them to recognize their assumptions (e.g. relying on controlled or 
explicit mentalizing), but also to start to consider other people’s subjective experiences using 
inference alongside mental state judgments based on appearance.  
The affective-cognitive polarity: Full mentalizing involves the integration of 
cognitive belief-states (dominated by a cognitive awareness of how other people’s attitudes 
and behavior are shaped by their own mental states and beliefs) and affective knowledge 
(dominated by inferences drawn from one’s own feelings, self-affective state propositions).  
BPD patients often over-rely on the logic of emotion in preference to the logic of cognition 
when assessing subjective states, and indiscriminatingly apply the very particular logic of 
emotion to wider thoughts and beliefs (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). These individuals thus will 
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show a bias toward attributing their own self-states to others (Baron-Cohen, Golan, 
Chakrabarti, & Belmonte, 2008; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 2000). At 
extremes, mental reality and physical/outer reality become equated and the patient’s genuine 
sense of conviction generates a so-called “concrete understanding” of psychological 
experience and an intolerance of alternative perspectives. 
The therapeutic target would be to encourage the patient to step back from this 
collapsing of appearance and reality, drawing attention to the patient’s vulnerability to 
emotional contagion and their difficulty in inserting doubt or uncertainty into a process of 
inference. The BPD patient will frequently experience moments in which they are 
overwhelmed by affect; the response of the therapist should be to help the patient integrate 
this intense sense of affective knowledge or awareness (whether about the self or others) with 
more reflective and cognitive knowledge.  
The self–other polarity: The capacity to differentiate between the self and other is 
often severely impaired in BPD patients (e.g., Barnow, Ruge, Spitzer, & Freyberger, 2005; 
Bender & Skodol, 2007; Blatt & Auerbach, 1988; Fuchs, 2007; Kernberg, 1984). From a 
mentalizing perspective, proneness to self-other confusion is explained by these patients’ 
frequent inability to inhibit their own reactions when they are thinking about the mind of 
someone else. This means that the shared world and individual minds are not clearly 
demarcated for them; they fully expect others to know what they are thinking and feeling and 
to see situations in the same way they do. This may also explain the common experience of 
therapists who find that BPD patients are determined to control the thoughts and feelings of 
those around them. Underpinning their apparent need for control may be an inability to 
inhibit the impingement of others’ mental states (Rigoni, Brass, Roger, Vidal, & Sartori, 
2013; Spengler, von Cramon, & Brass, 2010). 
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When a patient starts to talk about their own state in a non-mentalizing 
(hypermentalizing or overly concrete) way, the strategy adopted in MBT is to shift the 
patient’s attention to the mental state of others. This “contrary move”, one of the typical 
interventions in MBT, aims to surprise the patient and force him/her to mentalize the states of 
others. Similarly, when the patient becomes intensely concerned with someone else’s mental 
state, it may be helpful for them to consider how this preoccupation is affecting their own 
functioning. Working to shift the patient’s thoughts and feelings between the self and the 
other in a consistent, flexibly responsive way targets the patient’s tendency to become rigidly 
stuck in an unproductive mode of mentalizing by enabling him/her to be cognizant of the 
differences between himself/herself and others.  
In working across the four mentalizing polarities, the basic and consistent aim is to re-
establish mentalizing when it is lost – the typical starting point of mentalization-based 
interventions. This is clearest when a balanced form of mentalizing is no longer obvious. The 
task is not to seek structural or personality change in the patient with BPD, or explicitly aim 
to alter their representations, cognitions or schemas. Rather, the emphasis is on improving the 
patient’s capacity for mentalizing and to make their mentalizing skills more stable and robust 
so that they are more able to manage affect and think about problems, particularly within 
interpersonal relationships. 
Prementalizing Modes 
Modes of prementalizing tend to re-emerge whenever we lose the ability to mentalize, 
as typically happens in individuals with BPD, particularly in high arousal contexts (Fonagy & 
Target, 1997). We now understand the emergence of these non-mentalizing modes as 
indications of imbalance in mentalizing, where it comes to be dominated by one end of a 
mentalizing polarity, presumably as a function of weakening of the other pole. 
Conceptualizing this in terms of characteristic modes of subjectivity provides a further way 
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of appreciating the phenomenology of individuals with BPD features and thus provides the 
basis for a helpful formulation for clinical work. 
In the psychic equivalence mode, thoughts and feelings become “too real”, and there 
are no conceivable alternative perspectives.  In children under five years old, this inability to 
separate thought from reality is omnipresent (Gopnik, 1993).  There is a suspension of doubt; 
the individual increasingly believes that their own perspective is the only one possible. As we 
have seen, this state reflects the domination of the propositional logic of emotion states 
(where reality is defined by self-experience) over the propositional logic of cognition (where 
agent:attitude propositions permit knowledge that belief is independent of reality; Baron-
Cohen et al., 2008). Psychic equivalence makes all subjective experience excessively real. 
The overwhelming mental pain reported by BPD patients (Zanarini & Frankenburg, 2007) is, 
in our view, rooted in this aspect of mentalizing dysfunction. 
In the teleological mode, there is only recognition of real, observable goal-directed 
behavior and objectively discernible events. The individual can recognize the existence and 
potential role of mental states, but this recognition is limited to very concrete, observable 
goals. Congruent with this position, the individual cannot accept anything other than a 
modification in the realm of the physical as a true index of the intentions of the other. This 
reflects an extreme exterior focus in the mentalizing profile. The action proneness of 
individuals with BPD is often, rightly or wrongly, considered under the heading of 
impulsivity (Lawrence, Allen, & Chanen, 2010; Sebastian, Jacob, Lieb, & Tuscher, 2013). 
From a mentalizing perspective, impulsivity is associated with the externally focused 
subjectivity of the individual with BPD. If physical and visible features are prioritized, 
others’ or one’s own actions also become an inevitable focus. If a focus on “mental interiors 
– on thoughts, feelings and experiences – is inaccessible, then subjective reality may be 
possible to create only by making an impact on the physical world, whether that outer reality 
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is that of the social world (creating an impact through getting others to act) or the more 
constrained world of one’s own body (Lemma, 2012).  
In pretend mode, thoughts and feelings become severed from reality (which we term 
“hypermentalizing” or “pseudomentalizing”). Again, a mode of pretending, where reality is 
suspended and internal states are all that matter, is universal in young children, yet such states 
of mind are readily punctured when reality (or an adult) intrudes into the game. Retreating to 
this mode in adulthood is associated with a sense of meaninglessness which may be defensive 
but is no longer experienced as pleasurable. It is linked to an experience of emptiness, which 
may result in the individual becoming dependent on strong guiding voices that seem to 
promise a sense of meaning. These features of BPD are neglected in research and theoretical 
conceptualizations of this condition – quite inappropriately, in our opinion, given their 
prevalence and significance (Luyten, Fonagy, Lowyck, & Vermote, 2012; Sharp et al., 2011). 
In these states, ideas form no bridge between inner and outer reality; the mental world is no 
longer fully coupled with external reality. To make things feel real, a person in desperation 
may turn to self-injury or other dramatic acts to break out of the feeling of emptiness. The 
subjective experience of meaninglessness is a manifestation of what happens when explicit 
mentalizing is overridden by implicit mentalizing, so that there is excessive internal focus 
unchecked by reflection. A common consequence is hypermentalizing, where groundless 
inferences are made about mental states, sometimes reminiscent of confabulation. The 
ultimate meaninglessness of hypermentalizing is assured by other failures in the mentalizing 
process including poor belief-desire reasoning, a vulnerability to fusion with others’ identity, 
and a tendency to become lost in the complexity of the world of beliefs and desires with 
which physical reality is only loosely coupled.   
These three prementalizing modes are particularly important as they are often 
accompanied by a more acute experience of disorganization within the experience of the self. 
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Most modern psychology assumes that self-coherence (the sense that one has continuity and 
consistency in thought and behavior) is somewhat an illusion (Bargh, 2011, 2014). It is an 
illusion that is maintained by the creation of a mentalizing narrative around one’s thoughts 
and feelings, which in turn helps to create a coherent self-structure. If weakness of 
mentalizing capacity undermines this integrative process, incoherence in self-representation 
is likely to arise. Torturous feelings of badness, possibly linked to experiences of abuse which 
are felt to be part of the self but are not integrated with it (so-called “alien-self” parts), come 
to dominate self-experience. We assume that these discontinuities in self-experience (when 
the person feels aspects of their self-experience to be of themselves or their own, and yet also 
alien to their self-experience) generate a sense of incongruence, which is dealt with through 
externalizing – behaving toward others as though the others own the unmentalized self-
experiences and on occasions even being successful in generating these experiences in them 
(Fonagy & Target, 2000). This brings about relief, even if the immediate impact of 
externalizing a torturing part of the self in this way is to manipulate another person into 
punitive persecutory behavior towards oneself. Because of their intensity, the person with 
BPD experiences no option but to rid themselves of these feelings and attempt to dominate 
the mind of others by “manipulativeness”, self-injury, or other types of behavior that in the 
teleological mode are expected to relieve tension and arousal (Fonagy & Target, 2000).  
Mentalizing Profiles: Complexities and Paradoxes 
Understanding the different components and spectrums of mentalizing, as well as 
propensities towards certain modes of prementalization, is central to understanding 
mentalizing in BPD patients and how it should be targeted therapeutically (Fonagy & Luyten, 
2009). Improved mentalizing can only genuinely be reached by appreciating the particular 
strengths and weaknesses in mentalizing that any patient may show, and how these abilities 
may be undermined or reinforced in different situations.  
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The therapist should recognize that an individual’s capacity to mentalize varies across 
time according to their environment and stress arousal level. In particular, gaps in 
mentalizing in BPD patients are more likely to occur when the attachment system has been 
triggered (Chiesa & Fonagy, 2014; Fonagy et al., 1996). This inextricable link between 
mentalizing and attachment arousal means that mentalizing impairments in BPD may be 
partly relationship-specific. Assessment and evaluation of mentalization of BPD patients is 
therefore potentially unhelpful without regard to context. Any anomalies in relation to 
mentalizing are unlikely to be manifest in BPD patients unless the relationship in which 
mentalizing is being observed “pulls” for controlled mentalizing. The higher the level of 
attachment arousal in a particular relationship at a particular moment, the more likely that 
anomalies in mentalizing will emerge in these patients. Evidence strongly implies that as the 
attachment bond between therapist and client intensifies, the quality of BPD patients’ 
mentalizing will tend to deteriorate (Diamond, Stovall-McClough, Clarkin, & Levy, 2003). 
Thus, initial assessment of clients can leave therapists with the impression that they are 
working with an individual with relatively high psychological mindedness (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2012) and someone highly suitable for insight oriented psychotherapy. As trauma is 
typically associated with attachment insecurity, and anxious and disorganized attachment in 
particular, more traditional insight-oriented treatments might be especially risky (Fonagy & 
Bateman, 2006). Furthermore, transference typically intensifies as treatment progresses, 
activating the patient’s internal working models of particular child–parent relationships and 
their attachment system in general; the quality of psychological mindedness is likely to 
deteriorate significantly and the patient’s capacity to perceive the therapist’s mind as different 
from his or her own mental state will be quite limited at times (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 
2008). Treatment should therefore aim to find the optimal balance between attachment 
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activation and mentalizing (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006) as well as applying an especially 
sensitive approach to mentalizing in the context of remembering trauma (Allen, 2012, 2013). 
With regards to the multi-dimensional nature of mentalizing, it has long been 
observed that BPD patients are not necessarily unable to mentalize; they may in some 
respects and in certain situations show normal or even superior mentalizing skills. Individuals 
with BPD commonly excel in one particular form of mentalizing: intuitive empathy. This 
contrast between eminent capability in intuitive empathy and drastic impairment in other 
areas of mentalizing is commonly referred to as the “empathy paradox”. Dinsdale and Crespi 
(2013) reviewed 28 studies of empathic functioning in BPD in an attempt to resolve the so-
called “empathy paradox”. They report that in about half the studies, mentalizing – assessed 
in terms of levels of empathy – is enhanced in BPD. They particularly note the superiority of 
BPD patients in tasks that call for inference of others’ intentions (as in Ladisich & Feil, 
1988), or perceiving and responding strategically to small social cues indicating fairness 
(Franzen et al., 2011).  Some studies have found that individuals with BPD are superior to 
normal controls in the accuracy with which they attribute mental states to others on the basis 
of external features (e.g., Domes et al., 2008; Lynch et al., 2006; Schulze, Domes, Koppen, & 
Herpertz, 2013); (yet see Matzke, Herpertz, Berger, Fleischer, & Domes, 2014; Mier et al., 
2013), indicating the reliance of BPD patient on the use of external cues in their assessment 
of mental states. Furthermore, Ladisich and Feil (1988) assessed the perception of other 
people’s feelings and personality by comparing individuals’ self-ratings with personality 
ratings made by others (BPD patients, non-BPD patients, and psychiatrist expert raters).  
Ratings made by BPD patients matched self-ratings better than those of non-BPD patients, 
indicating higher empathy among the BPD patients, although they did not quite manage to 
outperform the expert raters.  The experience of “borderline empathy” is familiar to most 
therapists suddenly struck by a remarkably insightful comment by their BPD patient. 
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However, the superior intuition often displayed by individuals with BPD will often be 
conspicuously absent in times of interpersonal stress and activation of the attachment system. 
The dangers of not recognizing the unevenness and complexity of an individual’s 
mentalizing performance can lead to the apparently iatrogenic effects often described in 
unsuccessful therapeutic encounters for BPD (Higgitt & Fonagy, 1992). Therapists working 
with BPD patients usually learn to recognize that exceptional interpersonal sensitivity should 
not be taken as an indication of psychological mindedness (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). 
However, some therapists may misjudge this and address issues at a level of complexity 
which is simply beyond the patient’s capacity to process (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006).  Such 
unwarranted sophistication will result in failure to overcome the rigidity of thinking that 
characterizes patients with personality disorders in general. In the next section we will 
discuss the theory of epistemic trust and how this might account for the rigid, ‘hard-to-reach’ 
quality observed in individuals with BPD. 
Mentalizing and Communication: A Common Factor in the Treatment of BPD? 
We argue that the reasons for the importance of using mentalizing as a target for 
therapy in BPD partly lie in the particular attachment history and impairments in mentalizing, 
and related epistemic hypervigilance (Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2014), of patients with 
BPD.  The special significance of emotional neglect and abuse to BPD is particularly 
accounted for by the theory of epistemic trust (Sperber et al., 2010).  Sperber suggests that 
evolution has prepared us to acquire culturally relevant new knowledge either because of its 
content (e.g., its deductive relations with other beliefs which we arrive at though logical 
inference) or, more commonly, we accept knowledge about our world and about ourselves 
from “teachers” on account of their authority as a source of knowledge, which overcomes 
natural and appropriate epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010). Such information may be 
considered to be “deferentially” transmitted, (Recanati, 1997) by someone whose 
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communication has the quality of epistemic trust: its source is known, remembered and 
judged to be reliable (or epistemically trustworthy). This information can then be assumed to 
be common knowledge shared by members of one’s community.   
But what of an individual whose social experiences have led them to a state of chronic 
epistemic mistrust, where (perhaps because of hypermentalizing) they imagine the motives of 
the communicator to be malign? In this context the individual will appear to be resistant to 
new information, might be considered to be rigid or even bloody-minded, because they treat 
new knowledge from the communicator with deep suspicion and will not internalize it (i.e., 
modify internal structures to accommodate it). Their epistemic trust has been undermined, 
and an evolutionarily prepared channel for the acquisition of personally relevant information 
is blocked. We suspect that it is less likely to be the frank brutality of abuse that undermines 
epistemic trust (although of course it can do) and that neglect and emotional abuse will play a 
larger role in making an individual excessively vulnerable to disturbances in trusting 
information from others. Taking the perspective of epistemic trust as the mediator of culture, 
and its key underlying engine for progression, we now consider the destruction of trust in 
social knowledge as the key mechanism in pathological personality development.   
It is the disturbance of epistemic trust in our opinion that generates the apparent 
rigidity typical of BPD patients. The rigidity, however, is in the eyes of the communicator 
who, in accordance with the principles of theoretical rationality, expects the recipient to 
modify their behavior on the basis of the information they received and apparently 
understood. But, in the absence of trust, the capacity for change is absent. The information 
presented is not used to update the individual’s social understanding. In terms of the theory of 
natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009), the person has (temporarily) lost the capacity for 
social learning. From a therapist’s standpoint, he/she has become hard to reach and 
interpersonally inaccessible.  Research suggests that there may be different routes to 
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problems with epistemic distrust in BPD (Fonagy & Luyten, in press). In most patients, 
problems trusting others as a source of knowledge about the world reflect a combination of 
cognitive problems, impulsivity, and disruptions in attachment relationships, and trauma in 
particular. The typical affect-driven, automatic mentalizing of BPD patients further disrupts 
epistemic trust.  
The Learning Systems Involved in Improved Mentalizing 
It is an empirical fact that a number of psychotherapies appear to work roughly 
equally well in the treatment of BPD. Based on the mentalizing model of BPD and the model 
of communication outlined above, we argue that three systems underpin the process of 
therapeutic change in BPD. In our opinion, these three systems relate to each other in order, 
cumulatively, to make change possible. Yet, current views tend to favor and prioritize 
primarily the first of these systems, leading to a relative neglect of the two other systems. 
Communication System 1: The teaching and learning of content 
All evidence-based treatments of BPD provide a coherent, consistent, and continuous 
framework enabling the patient to examine, in a safe and low-arousal context, the issues that 
are deemed central according to the theoretical approach concerned (e.g., early schemas, 
invalidating experiences, object relations, attachment experiences). Across the course of 
therapeutic treatment – if the treatment is sufficiently coherent, reliable and predictable in its 
delivery – the patient begins to feel safe enough to allow a relaxation of epistemic 
hypervigilance. This enables the patient to reach a point where they can digest and 
contemplate the therapeutic “wisdom” being proposed to them. The relative importance of 
System 1 needs to be understood: therapies without a coherent body of knowledge based on 
systematically established principles have been observed to fail – to that extent, the content of 
this “wisdom” matters (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). All evidence-based effective models of 
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therapy present the patient with models of mind, disorder, and processes of change that are 
convincing and accurate enough to let the patient relax their hypervigilance and see the 
model’s relevance to their state of mind. This process of teaching and learning between 
therapist and patient – of showing the relevance of the wisdom (or the theory that underpins 
the orientation) – is made possible only by mentalizing and a collaborative working approach 
that models a mentalizing stance. However, the fact that there are so many different therapies, 
using so many different theoretical models that have been found to have some beneficial 
effect, indicates that the significance of System 1 lies not so much in the essential truth of its 
wisdom as in the fact that it allows the patient to put to apply this new learning in a more or 
less concrete way. This brings us to System 2. 
Communication System 2: The re-emergence of social learning 
Where System 1 concerns the content of what is learned in treatment, System 2 is 
concerned with how learning is made possible again. In the process of effectively passing on 
knowledge about the patient’s condition (in System 1), the therapist uses ostensive cues 
(Russell, 1940; Wilson & Sperber, 2012), which signal meaningful communication of 
relevance. As Csibra and Gergely (2011) have established, this signaling works through 
conveying that the communicator is specifically and uniquely concerned with the individual 
being communicated to and is seeking to understand that individual’s perspective. Ostensive 
communication with the patient is in essence modeling mentalizing. By creating an open and 
trustworthy social situation, a better understanding of the other is made possible. This in turn 
allows for a more trusting, less paranoid interpersonal relationship between therapist and 
patient, which facilitates not just the transmission of model-specific knowledge (as in System 
1) but, through improving the patient’s capacity to understand others, regenerates their 
potential to receive and absorb social information again. Ideally, the patient’s feeling of 
having been sensitively responded to opens a virtuous cycle in interpersonal communications 
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in which mentalizing has been learned to be possible; this, in turn, facilitates learning from 
others about one’s own mind as well as about the mind of others. By the therapist showing 
that their mind has been changed by the patient, they are giving agency to the patient and 
increasing their faith in the value of social understanding. 
Communication System 3: Learning beyond therapy. 
The erosion of epistemic hypervigilance and the improvements in mentalizing that the 
patient experiences in the context of the therapeutic relationship is likely to lead to 
meaningful change only if the virtuous circle of communication is maintained beyond 
therapy. Improvements in mentalizing lead to improvements in social relations, and a higher 
level of epistemic trust enables the individual to learn from their social experiences in a 
positive way. This goes beyond applying insights gained in treatment to relationships outside 
treatment, as the generalization of knowledge belongs to System 1 (and in part also to System 
2). Learning beyond therapy involves much more, and is also not that easy. The advantages 
of these engagements with the wider social world are available to the patient only if their 
social environment is benign enough to generate such benefits.  
The common feature in successful therapies, despite their often wildly different 
approaches, is thus, in our opinion, that they involve mentalizing. Mentalizing is a generic 
way of establishing epistemic trust, and therefore achieving change by being open to different 
kinds of social experience. Having one’s subjectivity understood – that is, being mentalized 
by someone else – is the necessary key to reopening the ability to learn about and from the 
social world. The experience of being safely and appropriately thought about then makes the 
patient feel safe enough to go on to think about the wider social world. Mentalizing opens up 
communication – the epistemic superhighway for the transfer of personally relevant 
information, the fundamental biological route to information transmission – and, therefore, 
the possibility of changing perceptions, expectations and information about others, about 
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social processes, and the myriad knowledge elements that sustain all of us and support our 
adaptation to the social world.  
Implications for Treatment  
The Mentalizing Focus in Mentalization-Based Treatment  
While we have already discussed general treatment principles following from our 
considerations concerning the nature and origins of BPD, the mentalizing approach has also 
led to the development and manualization of specific mentalization-based treatments, 
including MBT for BPD (Allen et al., 2008; Bateman & Fonagy, 2006). Here, we briefly 
summarize the core principles, interventions and treatment strategies of MBT. 
Our theoretical model implies that in order to maximize the impact on the patient’s 
ability to think about thoughts and feelings in relationship contexts, especially in the early 
phases of treatment, the therapist is probably most helpful when interventions (a) are simple 
and easy to understand, (b) are affect focused, (c) actively engage the patient, (d) focus on the 
patient’s mind rather than their behavior, (e) relate to a current event or activity – whatever is 
the patient’s currently felt mental reality (in working memory), (f) make use of the therapist’s 
mind as a model (by therapists disclosing their anticipated reaction in response to the event 
being discussed, i.e., talking about how the therapist anticipates that he or she might react in 
that situation), (g) flexibly adjust complexity and emotional intensity in response to the 
intensity of the patient’s emotional arousal (i.e., withdrawing when arousal and attachment 
are strongly activated).  
The key task of therapy is thus to promote curiosity about the way mental states 
motivate and explain the actions of self and others. Therapists achieve this through the 
judicious use of the “inquisitive stance”, highlighting their own interest in the mental states 
underpinning behavior, qualifying their own understanding and inferences (showing respect 
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for the opaqueness in mental states), and demonstrating how such information can help the 
patient to make sense of their experiences. Pseudomentalization and other fillers to replace 
genuine mentalization must be explicitly identified by therapists, and the lack of practical 
success associated with them clearly highlighted. In this way therapists can help their patients 
to learn about how they think and feel about themselves and others, how that shapes their 
responses to others, and how “errors” in understanding self and others may lead to 
inappropriate actions. Put simply, it is not for the therapist to “tell” patients about how they 
feel, what they think, or how they should behave, or what the underlying reasons may be for 
their difficulties. Any therapy approach that moves towards claiming to “know” how patients 
“are”, how they should behave and think, and “why they are the way they are”, is likely to be 
harmful to patients with a vulnerable capacity to mentalize.  
This principle applies to CBT as much as to psychodynamic psychotherapy. For 
example, Davidson and colleagues demonstrated that high levels of therapist integrative 
complexity (an indication of the number of ideas being combined in a single statement) was 
associated with relatively poor outcome in CBT, while the patients’ increase in integrative 
complexity marked improvement in social functioning (Davidson, Livingstone, McArthur, 
Dickson, & Gumley, 2007). 
Individuals with BPD may perform experimental mentalizing tasks relatively well 
under low arousal (Arntz, Bernstein, Oorschot, & Schobre, 2009), but cannot explain the 
states of mind they experience under high arousal. Unfortunately, psychotherapists of many 
orientations often attempt to provide mentalistic understandings for issues that trigger intense 
emotional reactions (challenging interpersonal situations, issues of shame, guilt, feelings of 
inadequacy, etc.) at a time when the patient’s capacity for effective explicit mentalization is 
practically inaccessible (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). Particularly in severely disturbed BPD 
patients, treatments that strongly rely on reflective capacities might actually become 
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iatrogenic (Lemma, Target, & Fonagy, 2011; Luyten, Fonagy, Lemma, & Target, 2012). 
Such patients may benefit more from a mental process or mentalizing approach, where the 
focus is on distortions in processes related to the metacognitive ability to reflect on the self 
and others (Fonagy, Moran, & Target, 1993; Luyten, Blatt, & Fonagy, 2013). A titrated but 
more or less exclusive focus on the BPD patient’s current mental state while activating the 
attachment relationship is expected to enhance the patient’s mentalizing capacities without 
generating iatrogenic effects. Hence, treatment should avoid situations where patients are 
expected to talk of mental states that they cannot link to subjectively felt reality. In the case 
of BPD, we argue that the therapeutic aim needs to be reconfigured away from the traditional 
psychodynamic pursuit of insight, to an emphasis on the recovery of balanced mentalizing: 
the achievement of representational coherence and integration. Thus, with regard to dynamic 
therapies, there should be (a) a de-emphasis of “deep” unconscious interpretations in favor of 
conscious or near conscious content, (b) careful eschewing of descriptions of complex mental 
states (e.g., conflict, ambivalence, unconscious) that are incomprehensible to a person whose 
mentalizing is vulnerable, (c) avoidance of extensive discussion of past trauma, except in the 
context of reflecting on current perceptions of mental states of maltreating figures and 
changes in mental state from being a victim in the past versus one’s experiences now. Careful 
attention to the BPD patient’s current mental state, while activating the attachment 
relationship, serves to enhance the patient’s mentalizing capacities without generating the 
iatrogenic effects that can arise from the activation of a disorganized attachment system.    
MBT Structure and Protocol 
MBT is organized around the development of an attachment relationship with the 
patient, offering a careful focus on the patient’s internal mental processes as they are 
experienced moment by moment and emphasizing the therapeutic alliance with the active 
repair of ruptures in the patient–therapist relationship (Bateman & Fonagy, 2009). 
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Importantly, the treatment is delivered according to a carefully constructed protocol, which 
informs the therapist about how to manage common clinical situations using basic principles. 
In sum, these are: 
1. A collaborative approach to and formulation of patient problems 
2. Identification of non-mentalizing processes 
3. General stance 
a) Interventions consistent with the patient’s mentalizing capacity 
b) Monitoring of the state of affective arousal 
c) Focus on maintaining therapist mentalizing 
d) Openness of therapist’s mind states and explicit identification of therapist’s 
feelings related to patient’s mental states 
e) Alert to breaks in mentalizing. 
4. “Not-knowing” stance of curiosity 
5. Identification of mentalizing poles 
6. Trajectory of sessions: implementation and marking interventions structured from 
empathic validation to exploration, clarification, and challenge through affect 
identification and affect focus to mentalizing the relationship and counter-
relationship. 
1. Collaborative approach and formulation 
The therapist generates a collaborative process in which both patient and therapist 
become inquisitive about agreed difficulties. Problems are initially organized in a mentalizing 
formulation, which is jointly agreed and reviewed every three months. Overall, the 
collaborative approach is embedded in the therapist’s general stance and attitude.  
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2. Identification of non-mentalizing process 
Clinicians carefully monitor for non-mentalizing processes. This is indicated for 
example by over-generalization, fixed beliefs of self and other, motives understood in terms 
of behaviors rather than mental states. Some non-mentalizing states are indicated by the 
therapist’s behavior. Therapists who lose concentration or only grunt as the patient talks are 
often affected by pretend mode functioning in the patient; therapists suggest how to solve 
problems or tell the patient what to do without exploration are likely to be involved in 
teleological processes; the confused therapist who nods wisely is often struggling with 
understanding psychic equivalence. However, it should be noted that the three primary non-
mentalizing modes are not mutually exclusive and are more likely to interweave than to 
manifest in pure form. 
3. General stance 
There are certain general principles for the therapist to follow in the clinical practice 
of MBT (Bateman, 2012).  
a) Any intervention needs to take into account the patient’s mentalizing ability. If 
their state of mind is held in psychic equivalence, complex interpretation or 
cognitive appraisal of the validity of the belief will be outside their 
comprehension. Such interventions need a higher level of mentalizing if they are 
to be effective. Fundamentally, the patient has to be able to think about his/her 
current state and appraise it without “living” it before such interventions are 
useful. 
b) The therapist takes into account the patient’s current affective state. If the patient 
is aroused, mentalizing will be compromised; the therapist needs to deal with the 
emotional dysregulation first. Once the patient begins to mentalize, the therapist 
can increase focus on affect.  
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c) The therapist ensures that he/she maintains his/her own mentalizing. This is a 
priority in MBT. If the therapist’s mentalizing is lost, retrieving it takes 
precedence over all other processes; if necessary, the therapist temporarily stops 
the session to facilitate this. Openly retrieving one’s own mentalizing is a useful 
model for the patient: “I am sorry I lost my ability to concentrate there and 
became too reactive when I said that. Let me go back…” 
d) The openness of the therapist’s mind states in relation to the patient’s mind states 
is central to MBT. The therapist will talk about what is in his/her mind in relation 
to the patient’s mind. In this regard there is a certain level of self-disclosure, but 
this is carefully “marked”. Marking is explicitly identifying whether what is said 
is the therapist’s state of mind, his/her subjective experience, or the therapist’s 
representation of the patient’s state of mind. For example, the therapist’s 
statement “I am confused” is about the therapist’s state, but “It comes across to 
me that you are confused” is about the patient.  
e) The therapist is sensitive to breaks in mentalizing as evidenced by the dialogue, 
and is alert to changes in the patient’s emotional arousal. This ensures that the 
patient focuses on actual mental processing as it happens and begins to recognize 
that emotions disrupt thoughts and interpersonal process.  
A patient was talking about her children, who had been taken into care through child 
protection procedures, and her determination to have them back. She became angry about 
how she had been treated, then abruptly said that what was really a problem for her was that 
the gearbox had gone on her car and the drive shaft had broken. The therapist captured this 
sudden change in topic by saying “What happened there? How come you suddenly shifted to 
your broken car away from the children? What happened in your mind?” 
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The therapist also seeks to see whether he/she contributed to any break in mentalizing 
that occurs in the therapy. This will indicate how sensitive the patient is to aspects of 
interpersonal interaction. For example, when the therapist said “Calm down” to a patient in a 
concerned manner, the patient reacted strongly by saying “Don’t tell me what to do. I am not 
taking orders from you”. The therapist’s remark had triggered a sensitive area, which could 
be recognized and explored to stimulate the patient’s capacities to monitor how he/she 
processes his/her thoughts and feelings and what impairs these capacities. 
4. Not-knowing stance 
The not-knowing stance requires the therapist to work authentically from the 
perspective of equality and collaboration – the therapist can never know what is really going 
on in others’ mind states. The therapist has to accept the validity of the patient’s experience 
even if he/she does not understand it. The therapist does not have to understand the patient or 
to make sense of what seems incomprehensible. If the therapist does not know what the 
patient is talking about, the therapist does not try to piece it together but says: “You know, I 
am having a real problem here, I can’t follow this, I can’t put it together, can we try again?” 
The aim of the not-knowing stance is to rekindle mentalizing in the session, to reflect 
on non-reflection as manifested in non-mentalizing. It is a key therapeutic attitude to enhance 
curiosity about mental process and experience. Curiosity is modelled by the therapist through 
reflecting on his/her own mind states without judgment and with empathic acceptance of 
experience. 
5. Identification of Mentalizing poles 
The therapist becomes attuned to indicators of non-mentalizing in the dialogue such 
as overuse of absolutes, simplistic over-determined explanations, and mental rigidity, which 
arises when the patient becomes stuck at one of the poles of mentalizing; the therapist tries to 
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rebalance this. For example, if the patient is highly other-externally focused, watching the 
therapist’s movements carefully, the therapist directs the dialogue toward an internal state to 
see whether this instils more reflection. 
A patient stated that the therapist was not to turn around to look at him as they 
walked down the corridor to the consulting room. The therapist asked what this backward 
glance did to the patient – an intervention to focus the patient on “self-internal” to balance 
his “other-external” focus. The patient kept the focus on the therapist and so the therapist 
accepted the patient’s “other-external” focus by saying he turned around simply as a social 
gesture and that he was not aware of any wish to offend. Having done this, the therapist 
again tried to rebalance the focus by asking the patient to describe what he had experienced 
from the backward glance. 
The same maneuver can be used if a person is excessively self-focused. The therapist 
intervenes to pull them out and get them to consider the “other” in some way, to balance their 
fixed focus on self. 
The self–other dimension can be focused upon in two ways. The first is by getting the 
patient to shift internally toward thinking about the other – for example, if they are blaming 
themselves for a relationship problem, they may be supported in focusing on the role of the 
partner. The second way is by harnessing the intersubjective, interpersonal experience 
between the patient and therapist. MBT involves both ways. So the therapist could say to a 
patient, on the one hand, “How are you so sure that you are useless and that the relationship 
problem is all you? What about your boyfriend’s role in this?” or, on the other hand, “I have 
never seen you like that. We seem to have a big difference here”. 
The same principle applies if a patient is excessively cognitive. The therapist balances 
this by harnessing the use of affective experience. This move to the affective pole can be 
difficult without becoming formulaic, for example, by continually asking someone how they 
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feel. This can be irritating for the patient, who may not know how they feel, and is often an 
unproductive intervention in terms of stimulating further mentalizing. For the therapist, the 
important factor is the quality of mentalizing – that is, whether it has become fixed and rigid 
rather than whether the mental processing is cognitive or affective. MBT recommends that 
the therapist increases interpersonal affectivity when the patient is fixed in a rigid cognitive 
rational process, or increases cognitive processing when the patient is trapped in affective 
dysregulation. To move from the cognitive pole, the therapist uses relational interventions in 
the dialogue (e.g., asking how the patient is feeling about someone); to move away from the 
affective pole, the therapist reduces the relational component and becomes more practical. 
For example a patient was talking about how she wanted her baby back. She stated ‘no one 
else is having my baby’. ‘They are not entitled to my baby. She is mine.’ She had worked out 
that if she behaved herself in a particular way when she was with the social workers they 
would think that she was now emotionally controlled and release her baby from child 
protection. She did not want her child fostered so she had worked out a strategy for not telling 
people about problems. This rationale was presented in the session. The therapist considered 
this to be a cognitively determined level of mentalizing of both self and other so he increased 
the relational and affective component of the dialogue. He said that he could see that she had 
worked out what to do to meet her goal of not letting someone else have her baby. But he had 
always had a sense that it was her love for her baby that meant she wanted her back rather 
than the entitlement. This was an initial intervention to increase the affective component of 
the dialogue and to place the therapist’s perspective as a relational aspect of the dialogue. 
From here the discussion moved to the relationship the patient had with her baby and if she 
could meet the baby’s emotional needs. The aim of these interventions is to make a 
mentalizing process more flexible, more responsive to context, and increasingly implicit. 
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6. Trajectory of sessions 
Empathy and support. MBT not only has an overall structure to the treatment 
programme (Bateman & Fonagy, 2006), but also identifies a trajectory for each session. In 
each session there is a recommended stepwise move from a supportive position toward a 
more relational, subjective, experiential process. MBT requires the therapist to start from an 
empathic and supportive position before moving toward a more relational focus. The 
therapist seeks to demonstrate an empathic understanding by using validation as the starting 
point, finding out the subjective truth of the patient’s experience, and demonstrating that 
he/she has understood it from the patient’s perspective. Only then can the therapist “sit 
alongside the patient” so that they both look at subjective experience from a shared vantage 
point. 
A patient asked, “Do you know what I have gone and done?” The patient stated that 
what she had done was utterly crazy. “I’ve got myself a job.” From the not-knowing stance, 
the therapist asked what was so crazy about it. The patient explained why it was crazy from 
her perspective. She had thought it was time she went to work and so got a part-time job, but 
explained that now she was working, paradoxically, she was earning less than when she had 
received unemployment benefit. So the therapist said “That is crazy – working and having 
less money and increased costs!” In this sense the therapist is empathic about her experience 
of being crazy. Taking an initial attitude that the decision was not crazy would have 
undermined the alliance and potentially left the patient feeling misunderstood. The 
complexity of the balance between the “craziness” and “about time I went to work” can be 
considered and explored later. The patient talked about getting less money, having to get out 
of bed, having to interact with people, and why the hell was she doing this? At this point the 
therapist was empathic, saying “That’s a great question. Why do that?” It is from there that 
Translation: Mentalization as Treatment Target in BPD 29 
This is the accepted version of a paper for publication in Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and 
Treatment (http://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/per/index.aspx). This article may not exactly replicate the final 
version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record. © American Psychological Association. 
December 30, 2014. 
the therapist and patient together work out what made her take the decision and what it had 
given her in terms of self-esteem. 
Exploration and clarification. As soon as the therapist senses that he/she and the 
patient have a shared affective platform, exploration and elaboration takes place with the 
clarification of mental states. In the example above, the therapist helps the patient elaborate 
and clarify the processes that she went through to make her decision, and how she came to a 
final conclusion that she wanted employment despite it being “crazy”. In addition, the 
therapist brings in some of his/her own thoughts about it. Clarification requires a 
reconstruction of events, but with an emphasis on the changing mental states, a tracing of 
process over time, and a recognition that decisions may be capricious and yet also of value. 
Challenge. Challenge as an intervention has certain defined characteristics: it is 
nearly always outside the normal therapy dialogue, out of line with the current dialogue, and 
comes as a surprise to the patient. The aim is for the patient to be suddenly derailed in their 
non-mentalizing process. If the intervention is successful, the therapist “stops and stands” the 
moment to prevent the patient continuing in the same mode. Once a stop and stand challenge 
has been effective in halting non-mentalizing, it is important to rewind to the point at which 
either the patient or therapist was mentalizing. 
A female patient was engaged in a diatribe about the prison service and its ill-
treatment of prisoners. She was highly aroused, shouting, ranting, and “reliving” her anger 
and rage. Any interruption by the therapist resulted in a dismissive comment. The therapist 
looked out of the window, wondering how to intervene and thinking that a challenge was 
necessary. As he looked out of the window, the patient said, “Don’t look out the window, you 
listen to me”. So the therapist retorted that he could look and listen at the same time, stating 
that he could multi-task. Before the patient could respond, he said, “Do you know why I can 
multi-task? Because I am a man.” At this point the patient stopped, not knowing whether to 
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laugh or react contemptuously. The therapist said that as a man he could only multi-task for 
a short time, so exhorted her to rest for a moment so that they could both collect their 
thoughts. This was a challenge: it was unexpected, and it stopped the ranting. The therapist 
was able to say that he thought it was better to sit back for a few minutes and rewind the 
session to start reflecting about what had happened that had led her to be sent to prison. 
Affect focus. Once therapist and patient are able to maintain a mentalizing 
interaction, MBT suggests increasing focus on affect and the interpersonal domain. The 
purpose of this is to recreate the core sensitivity of BPD patients in the session itself. People 
with BPD are highly sensitive to interpersonal process; arousal in the interpersonal domain 
triggers emotional dysregulation, which in turn disrupts mental processing further. MBT for 
BPD focuses on this area of sensitivity to generate more robust mentalizing around 
interpersonal processing. 
Affect focus is not simply labelling feelings – it is a way of increasing affective 
experience within the interpersonal relationship in the session by identifying implicit 
mentalizing and making it more explicit when the therapist and patient share some implicit 
process. It requires the therapist to recognize that both he/she and the patient are making 
unquestioned, jointly held, unspoken, assumptions. So the therapist names the experience as 
something that is shared between them. 
A patient was anxious in a session and managed his arousal by turning away from the 
therapist, falling silent and then saying “Yeah, yeah, I don’t know”. Implicit in this 
interactive process was the patient’s assumption that the therapist wanted him to talk more; 
there was some truth in this, for the therapist probed further at such times. But it was also 
apparent that the patient struggled with fears of becoming emotionally dysregulated to the 
extent of having to leave the session. The therapist was in a similar position with his 
assumption that the patient wanted to say more and his wariness that probing further could 
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increase the patient’s anxiety. MBT suggests that the therapist identifies the shared dilemma, 
making the implicit anxiety more explicit. In this example, the therapist said “We are both 
uncertain at the moment. With me, I am concerned that if I probe more it will make things 
worse for you and yet this is an area that we have to explore more. It looks to me like you are 
saying ‘don’t go further because it might not be safe to continue’. Where are you in this?” 
Having made this shared dilemma explicit, the therapist develops the mentalizing 
process around this interpersonal affectively charged area. To some extent this is a rehearsal 
in vivo of an affectively salient interpersonal interaction that may derail the patient in their 
close relationships. Accurate identification of the current affectively salient focus allows the 
therapist to segue to mentalizing the relationship without clumsily disrupting the 
interpersonal process.   
Mentalizing the relationship. The aim of mentalizing the relationship is to increase 
the affective interpersonal experience with the patient whilst maintaining mentalizing. If an 
attempt to mentalize the relationship triggers non-mentalizing, the process is abandoned and 
the therapist returns to empathy and supportive work before trying to move down the 
relational trajectory again. If mentalizing continues as the focus on the relationship 
progresses, MBT suggests a number of steps for the therapist to take. 
If the patient says something within the patient–therapist relationship that is of 
significance in the patient’s external relationships, the first task for the therapist is to validate 
the patient’s experience. Next, the therapist has to explore this sensitive area to get to an 
alternative perspective, or at least, a more complex understanding of what has happened. 
A patient told her therapist that he was too modest. To validate this experience, the 
therapist asked the patient what he does that is “too” modest. Importantly, he did not 
question it as a distortion; it is a valid experience contributed to by the therapist’s attitude. 
After the patient explained her reasons for believing that the therapist was too modest, and 
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identifying a recent example, the therapist’s task is to identify what it is like for the patient to 
be working with a therapist who is too modest – what does it matter that she has a therapist 
who she sees as too modest? What actually had happened was that the patient felt that if the 
therapist could not be proud of his achievements, it reduced her own achievements in life to 
futile meaningless events, because she saw them as being minimal compared to those of the 
therapist. She experienced this in psychic equivalence, so her experience of her achievements 
as useless meant that she as a human being was useless.  
Mentalizing the relationship is an attempt within the relationship to generate 
meaningful complexity about what has happened by engaging in a slowly unfolding relational 
process. At all times the therapist monitors the patient’s reaction to the alternative 
perspective. 
MBT adds caution in mentalizing the relationship. Side effects stimulated by the 
therapist are common: for example, if the patient’s experience is seen by the therapist as a 
distortion and the patient is alienated, or if the process becomes a jointly elaborated pretend 
mode in which both patient and therapist believe that they are working at depth when in fact 
they are engaged in clever cognitive work that is out of contact with affective reality. 
Mentalizing the counter-relationship. Mentalizing the counter-relationship, by 
definition, links to the therapist’s self-awareness and often relies on the affective components 
of mentalizing. Some therapists tend to default to a state of self-reference whereby they 
consider most of what they experience in therapy as relevant to the patient. This default mode 
needs to be resisted; therapists need to be mindful that their mental states might unduly color 
their understanding of the patient’s mental states and that therapists tend to equate them 
without adequate foundation.  The therapist has to “quarantine” his/her feelings. How the 
therapist does so informs the MBT technical approach to countertransference – defined as 
those experiences, both affective and cognitive, that the therapist has in sessions which he/she 
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thinks might further develop an understanding of mental processes. Feelings in the therapist 
are not considered initially as a result of projective processes and the therapist must identify 
experiences clearly as his/her own. That is, they are “marked”, and interventions using the 
counter-relationship are stated as the therapist’s experience. 
The simplest way to release countertransference experience from quarantine without 
equating the therapist’s feeling with that of the patient is for the therapist to state “I” at the 
beginning of an intervention. Intriguingly, this seems to be difficult for therapists, who 
understandably worry about violating therapeutic boundaries. Yet MBT does not suggest that 
therapists start to express their personal problems or talk about any feeling they might have in 
a session, whether relevant to the process or not. Rather, the therapist’s current experience of 
the process of therapy with the patient is to be shared openly, to ensure that the complexity of 
the interactional process can be considered. Patients need to be aware that their own mental 
processes have an effect on others’ mental states and that these, in turn, will influence the 
interaction. 
A patient with antisocial personality disorder sat in sessions leaning forward, pointing 
his finger at the therapist as he talked, and often using threatening language. Naturally this 
unnerved the therapist. The therapist was aware that the more unnerved he became the less 
likely it was for him to be able to maintain his mentalizing. At an appropriate moment in the 
discussion the therapist presented his current feelings in the therapy. ‘Now you mention the 
way you intimidate people perhaps I can bring something up here related to that. I don’t want 
to divert our discussion but many times in this session I have felt intimidated even if you 
don’t mean to intimidate me. It is a problem because I find I can then not easily concentrate 
on what you are talking about.’ At this point the patient interrupted to say that it was the 
therapist’s problem if he felt intimidated. So the therapist agreed and said that indeed it was 
his problem but because of the effect it had on him it then became a problem for treatment. 
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This allowed the patient and therapist to consider intimidation in interpersonal interactions 
and it became apparent that the patient was unaware of the effect he was having on others by 
his attitude and discourse.   
Common countertransference experiences associated with particular modes of 
psychological functioning include boredom with pretend mode, and anxiety to do something 
with psychic equivalence. Therapists need to become comfortable with managing these states 
of mind and be able to express them constructively in the service of extending the patient–
therapist collaboration. 
In all circumstances the therapist, once alerted by a change in his/her own feelings or 
behavior, should focus more carefully on his/her feeling and identify it openly – a move from 
implicit functioning to explicit process allowing a shared scrutiny. 
 
It is highly likely that our formulations concerning the role of mentalizing in BPD 
also have implications for other evidence-based treatments of this condition. In fact, we 
believe that these formulations clarify the role of common factors in these treatments, and 
suggest the need to develop more comprehensive and integrative treatments that focus on 
restoring the capacity for social learning in patients with BPD and allied conditions. 
Conclusion 
This paper emphasizes the simultaneous consideration of disruptions in three closely 
linked domains in individuals with BPD: (a) in attachment relationships, (b) in different 
polarities of mentalizing, and (c) in the quality of epistemic vigilance and trust. Such a focus 
not only provides a comprehensive understanding of patients with BPD, rendering seemingly 
paradoxical features of patients with BPD more comprehensible. In so doing, this approach 
also provides a clear therapeutic focus, enabling the therapist to monitor the therapeutic 
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process in terms of (impending) mentalizing impairments and epistemic mistrust as a result of 
the activation of the attachment system. We believe that the effectiveness of the mentalizing 
approach in helping patients with BPD might be particularly explained by the fact that it 
enables the therapist to maintain and foster a mentalizing stance, even – and perhaps 
particularly – under high arousal conditions, so typical of work with these patients. As a 
result, MBT may lead to a relaxation of epistemic hypervigilance in these patients, opening 
them up for what fundamentally characterizes human beings: an openness to learn from 
others about oneself, others, and oneself in relation to others. 
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